ANT-2026-B615AQ9E · exim/exim
off-by-one medium
Severity Claude high · Security research firm high · Maintainer medium
Discovered by Claude Mythos Preview
Anthropic's analysis, sealed at approval. Disclosure to the maintainer was performed by Calif.
ANT-2026-B615AQ9E: Exim dewrap() Off-By-One OOB Read → Code Execution
The dewrap() function in expand.c (lines 2399-2423) mishandles input where a backslash is immediately followed by the null terminator. The pointer p is incremented twice — once for the backslash and once for the assumed escaped character — advancing it past the end of the string into adjacent heap memory. An attacker who controls the input string can place a trailing backslash to trigger the overread. A demonstrated three-stage exploit (heap spray → malformed JSON → extract json trigger) leaks adjacent heap contents.
Target
Project: exim
Location: expand.c:2399
Discovery: static analysis — not yet dynamically reproduced
Technical Details
The escape-handling path unconditionally performs p++ for the backslash and p++ again for the escaped character without first checking whether the character after the backslash is '\0'. When the backslash is the final byte of the buffer, the second increment moves p one byte past the null terminator, and subsequent processing reads out-of-bounds heap memory.
Reproduction
- Spray the heap so attacker-chosen or sensitive data lies adjacent to the input buffer
- Submit malformed JSON whose string content ends with a lone backslash before the null terminator
- Invoke the extract json trigger, causing dewrap() to read past the null and return out-of-bounds bytes
[No reproducer or sanitizer output attached — request from security-cvd@anthropic.com if needed.]
Acknowledgement
This vulnerability was discovered by Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, and triaged by the Anthropic security team in collaboration with Anthropic Research. Please direct questions to security-cvd@anthropic.com and reference ANT-2026-B615AQ9E.
Reference: ANT-2026-B615AQ9E
Anthropic CVD Policy: https://www.anthropic.com/coordinated-vulnerability-disclosure
Triage and disclosure were performed by Calif.
- Verdict
- true positive
- Severity
- high
Dates from discovery through public reveal.
- 2026-03-29 Reported to tracker
- 2026-04-23 Patch released
- 2026-05-08 Sent to maintainer
- 2026-05-09 Maintainer acknowledged
- 2026-08-17 Publicly revealed
SHA-3-512 hash:
63eb8de51e73fbb8f1fc13cc19411badec1ea1d06bc18de4b32e6b64d018c1cb0057c933b8b5f2cc66541e6632a67f6898dbd2a27c45c4da35e8337751cd4e31
Committed 2026-05-08 00:09 PT
Revealed 2026-08-17 14:12 PT
Verify (download preimage.json)
Show preimage JSON
{
"ant_id": "ANT-2026-B615AQ9E",
"bug_class": "off-by-one",
"claude_severity": "high",
"commit_sha": null,
"created_at": "2026-03-30T01:10:19+00:00",
"description": "The dewrap() function in expand.c (lines 2399-2423) mishandles input where a backslash is immediately followed by the null terminator. The pointer p is incremented twice — once for the backslash and once for the assumed escaped character — advancing it past the end of the string into adjacent heap memory. An attacker who controls the input string can place a trailing backslash to trigger the overread. A demonstrated three-stage exploit (heap spray → malformed JSON → extract json trigger) leaks adjacent heap contents.",
"discovered_at": null,
"location": "expand.c:2399",
"poc_sha256": null,
"preimage_version": 1,
"project": "exim",
"reproduction": [
"1. Spray the heap so attacker-chosen or sensitive data lies adjacent to the input buffer",
"2. Submit malformed JSON whose string content ends with a lone backslash before the null terminator",
"3. Invoke the extract json trigger, causing dewrap() to read past the null and return out-of-bounds bytes"
],
"technical_details": "The escape-handling path unconditionally performs p++ for the backslash and p++ again for the escaped character without first checking whether the character after the backslash is '\\0'. When the backslash is the final byte of the buffer, the second increment moves p one byte past the null terminator, and subsequent processing reads out-of-bounds heap memory.",
"title": "Exim dewrap() Off-By-One OOB Read → Code Execution",
"vendor_severity": "high"
}